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ABSTRACT
Evolving cybersecurity threats are a persistent challenge for system
administrators and security experts as new malwares are continu-
ally released. Attackers may look for vulnerabilities in commercial
products or execute sophisticated reconnaissance campaigns to
understand a target’s network and gather information on security
products like firewalls and intrusion detection / prevention systems
(network or host-based). Many new attacks tend to be modifications
of existing ones. In such a scenario, rule-based systems fail to detect
the attack, even though there are minor differences in conditions /
attributes between rules to identify the new and existing attack. To
detect these differences the IDS must be able to isolate the subset of
conditions that are true and predict the likely conditions (different
from the original) that must be observed. In this paper, we propose
a probabilistic abductive reasoning approach that augments an exist-
ing rule-based IDS (snort [29]) to detect these evolved attacks by (a)
Predicting rule conditions that are likely to occur (based on existing
rules) and (b) able to generate new snort rules when provided with
seed rule (i.e. a starting rule) to reduce the burden on experts to
constantly update them. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the
approach by generating new rules from the snort 2012 rules set and
testing it on the MACCDC 2012 dataset [6].
CCS CONCEPTS
• Probabilistic representations→ Bayesian Networks;
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
The estimated loss to companies and organizations affected by
cyber-crimes is increasing [22], with targets being attacked through
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social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook. Cybersecu-
rity threats are constantly evolving as adversaries design new ways
to defeat existing systems. These threats are of two main types:
ones that use components of known threats and integrate them
to create a “new" attack and zero-day1 attacks where the attacker
discovers a new vulnerability in the product / system that can be
exploited before it can be patched up. Although detecting zero-day
attacks is the ideal expectation, in reality identifying attacks that
are slight modifications of existing attacks can be difficult too. Thus,
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) must be regularly updated with
the latest attacks even though attack patterns differ in only small
ways. Consider an example of the Wannacry ransomware attack2.
This malware targeted machines that operated on an older version
of Microsoft Windows using a known exploit called EternalBlue3.
An analysis of Wannacry revealed it to be similar to previous at-
tacks [15]. The same is true with another well-known ransomware
ExPetr4 and a modified version Bad Rabbit5.
This phenomenon is clearly visible when we look at snort rules
that contain signature patterns for various cybersecurity threats.
Table 1 shows an example set of snort rules that are similar with
their corresponding CVE IDs. Snort rule MS06-040 [10] tries to alert
administrators to a buffer overflow attack on the Microsoft server
service while MS08-067 [11] checks for an overflow attack triggered
by a specific RPC request. Both rules target the same service but
have minor variations to accommodate the different methods used
to trigger the buffer overflow attack.
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are of three types [3]:
(1) Signature-based systems where the attack patterns [29]
are defined. These systems cannot detect zero-day attacks.
As new malware is detected, a customized signature must be
designed for each attack (or combined with others depending
on the system).
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zero-day(computing)
2https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WannaCryransomwareattack
3https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EternalBlue
4https://securelist.com/schroedingers-petya/78870/
5https://securelist.com/bad-rabbit-ransomware/82851/
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Snort Rule SIG-ID
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET [135,139,445,593,1024:]
(msg:"NETBIOS DCERPC NCACN-IP-TCP srvsvc NetrPathCanonicalize overflow attempt"; flow:established,
to_server;dce_iface:4b324fc8-1670-01d3-1278-5a47bf6ee188;byte_jump: 4, -4,multiplier 2,relative,align,
dce; byte_test:4,>,256,0,relative,dce; metadata: policy balanced-ips drop, policy connectivity-ips
drop, policy security-ips drop, service netbios-ssn; classtype:attempted-admin; sid:7209; rev:13;)
7209
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET [135,139,445,593,1024:]
(msg:"NETBIOS DCERPC NCACN-IP-TCP srvsvc NetrpPathCanonicalize path canonicalization stack overflow
attempt "; flow:established,to_server; dce_iface:4b324fc8-1670-01d3-1278-5a47bf6ee188; dce_opnum:31,
32;dce_stub_data; pcre:"/^(\x00\x00\x00\x00|.{4}(\x00\x00\x00\x00|.{12}))/sR";byte_jump:4,-4,
multiplier 2,relative,align,dce;pcre:"/\x00\.\x00\.\x00[\x2f\x5c]/R";metadata:policy balanced-ips
drop, policy security-ips drop, service netbios-ssn;classtype:attempted-admin; sid:14782;rev:12;)
14782
Table 1: The table shows two snort rules for a Microsoft remote code execution vulnerability (MS06-0406, MS08-0677) with a critical prior-
ity. Their respective CVE-IDs are 2006-3439 and 2008-4250. The differences between them are in four parameters, namely, dci_iface, pcre,
dce_opum and dce_stub_data. The remaining attributes remain the same.
(2) Machine learning based systems are of two types. They
detect misuse by classifying the traffic as malicious or benign.
Anomaly detection systems try to define “normal" behavior
for each process on a host system or the network. These
systems cannot detect a specific attack (like EternalBlue) but
are able to detect if anomalous (not necessarily malicious)
execution happens. The False Alarm Rate (FAR) can be a
challenge with anomaly detection mechanisms.
(3) Hybrid systems that combine both machine learning mod-
els with signature-based systems.
While signature-based systems require constant rule updates, a
major challenge with data-driven methods is their vulnerability to
traffic that is skewed between benign and malicious components.
The relevant datasets that are openly available (KDD1999 [8], MAC-
CDC 2012 [6]) have a higher degree of malicious traffic as compared
to a live stream where a disproportionately large portion of the
traffic is benign. As described above, rule-based systems are unable
to counter threats that deviate from pre-defined signatures. We
solve this problem by building a model that abduces likely missing
conditions / antecedents from rules.
Abductive Reasoning is a mechanism for generating an infer-
ence that explains given observations with maximum likelihood.
It is widely used in a number of tasks such as diagnosis of med-
ical conditions based on observed symptoms in a patient [27] to
intrusion detection and hypothesizing intrusion objectives [9].
Consider again, the snort rules in table 1. The antecedents of the
rule are the conditions that need to be satisfied so that the alert is
generated. Thus, conditions such as the protocol (tcp / udp), source
/ target ip-address, source / target port number, dce_iface,
byte_test and byte_jump are the antecedents in the rule. Sim-
ilarly, the consequent of a rule can be attributes whose values are
changed (when the conditions are met). With snort, each conse-
quent is an alert message. The difference between the two rules are
the parameters dci_iface, pcre, dce_opum and dce_stub_data.
In this paper, we propose a hybrid system that augments a rule-
based system (snort) with a probabilistic abductive reasoning model
trained from pre-existing snort rules. It performs two tasks, namely,
(a) Predict antecedents / conditions in rules that are likely to occur
(or are occurring but remain unobserved as they are part of different
snort rule whose conditions have not been satisfied), (b) Generate
new rules by predicting a unique combination of antecedents. For
example, given the antecedents of first rule (SIG-ID: 13162) in table 3,
the model generates a new rule (SID: 250001) that has the target port
number changed from [139,445] to [135,139,445,593,1024]
and drops conditions dce_stub_data and byte_test.
The pre-existing snort rules are used to learn the correlation
between antecedents / attributes in a rule. Once, the correlations
are learned, the model abduces antecedents that are likely occur
given a seed (initialization) rule. The antecedents from the seed are
used to generate new rules so as to expand the coverage of attacks
detected by existing rules.
This paper is divided into the following sections. Section 2 pro-
vides an overview of various machine learning, rule based and
hybrid methods for intrusion detection. Also, we discuss abductive
reasoning methods. Section 3 describes the Bayesian model and
pipeline used to generate snort rules. In section 4, we discuss exper-
iments conducted with snort rules dataset and with the MACCDC
2012 dataset. Section 5 describes future directions for our work.
2 BACKGROUND & RELATEDWORK
2.1 Machine Learning for Cybersecurity
Over the years, a number of techniques have employed machine
learning for intrusion detection. Amor et al. [1] train a Naive Bayes
network to classify attacks and show that it has competitive perfor-
mance. They compare it against a C4.5 decision tree. Valdes et al.
[33] construct a Bayesian network (eBayes TCP) for the same pur-
pose. The use of artificial neural networks was explored by Cannady
et al. [4] who trained a neural network to perform multi-category
misuse classification. A similar approach was taken by Mukkamala
et al. [23] who compared against a support vector machine. Luo
et al. [19] learned fuzzy association rules to construct generalized
patterns to improve intrusion detection. Genetic algorithms (GA)
have been utilized as well [40]. In inductive learning, rules are in-
duced directly from the training data. One such common inductive
learning process is Repeated Incremental Pruning to Produce Error
Reduction (RIPPER) [5].
Lee et al. [18] construct a two-stage process where different algo-
rithms (like frequent episodes) extract features that RIPPER uses to
generate rules. Among more recent methods, Niyaz et al. [16] use a
2
Figure 1: Pipeline to build the Bayesian Abductive Reasoning model. It consists of multiple stages (a) Preprocessing stage where the rule is
encoded by categorizing the attributes and then converting them to a one-hot encoded representation (b) Building the Bayesian model (c)
Rule generation and attribute prediction. A (in red) is a sample snort alert. B (in green) is the generated snort rule. X represents the missing
antecedent in the snort rule A.
self-taught learning algorithm that combines a sparse autoencoder
(unsupervised pre-training) and a multi-layer perceptron (super-
vised fine tuning) to classify normal and malicious traffic in the
KDD99 dataset. Fiore et al. [13] use a Discriminative Restricted
Boltzmann machine to train a semi-supervised classifier that can
detect anomalies in network traffic. The neural network is trained
on “normal" traffic and learns a criteria for normality. Any devia-
tion from normal behavior is flagged as an anomaly. Wang et al.
[38] similarly try to identify traffic but use a stacked auto-encoder
instead while Erfani et al. [12] implement a deep belief network
(DBN) and fine-tune the model to detect anomalies by using a lin-
ear SVM. Ma et al. [20] combine spectral clustering with a deep
neural network to detect attacks. The network is trained in two
stages. First, the training data is divided into subset using spectral
clustering. The test data is then assigned the pseudo cluster labels
depending on the distance of the test datapoint from each cluster.
Then, the neural network is trained on the combined set of pseudo
labels. Yu et al. [41] improve on the performance of these network
models with a stacked dilated convolutional auto-encoder. Wang
et al. [37] utilize a convolutional neural network to classify mal-
wares. They subsequently use a convolutional LSTM architecture
to learn spatio-temporal features [36]. Buczak et al. [3] and Xin et
al. [39] provide an overview of machine learning and deep learning
methods used in cybersecurity.
But training effective machine learning methods is a challenge.
Data-driven models require the network traffic on which they are
trained to represent the likely distribution of the traffic when they
are employed. This forces security analysts to re-train the model on
a regular (sometimes daily) basis [3]. Also, there is a lack of good
quality labeled data that contains normal and malicious traffic, even
though the volume of data available is high. As new attacks are dis-
covered, annotating the data is a continuous and expensive process.
Vu et al. [35] try to solve this problem by generating synthetic net-
work traffic using an Auxilliary Generative Adversarial Network.
The additional data can be utilized to better train a classifier. In
this paper though, we look at methods to enhance existing rule-
based systems, benefiting from the rules already created by security
analysts.
Although patterns are manually crafted in signature-based IDS,
their performance can be improved by automatically generating
rules. Gomez et al. [14] use a pareto-based multi-objective evolu-
tionary algorithm to evolve snort rules. Vollmer et al. [34] try to
reduce the effort of creating rules when an intrusion is detected by
automating the rule creation process. In our research, a Bayesian
network is trained on snort rules rather than an evolutionary ge-
netic algorithm.
2.2 Abductive Reasoning
As described in the introduction, abductive reasoning is the process
of hypothesizing a cause given observed effects. Broadly, abductive
reasoning methods can be classified into two types: logic-based
[32] and probabilistic [17] methods. Kate et al. [17] build a proba-
bilistic abductive reasoning algorithm with a markov logic network.
Raghavan et al. [28] designed a Bayesian abductive logic program
framework to perform tasks such as plan recognition where the
set of observable facts are inadequate to reason deductively. Logic
Tensor Networks [31] proposed by Serafini et al. create a single
framework to represent first-order predicate logic so as to deduc-
tively reason over a knowledge base.
3 PROBLEM DEFINITION
3.1 Preliminaries
Consider a set of n rules R = {R1 ... Rn }. Let A = {A1 ... Al }
represents the complete set of l antecedents. Each rule Ri has a set
ofm antecedents given by Ri = {ai1 ... aim } where 1 < m < l (ai1 is a
specific value whileAi1 is the category / feature/ variable). The rules
can have varying numbers of antecedents. In the following sections,
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antecedents and attributes are used interchangeably to define the
attribute in a snort rule. Snort rules are defined as follows:
Ri := {ai1, ..., aim |ai1 ∈ Ai1 ... aim ∈ Aim } (1)
is equivalent to:
ai1 ∧ ... ∧ aim ⇒ Ri (2)
In snort, each rule is considered to be a conjunction of attributes
(defined in the alert) / antecedents. Also, snort rules do not use
consequent (Ri ) variables as antecedents (i.e. on L.H.S of the rule).
Each component of the rule is associated with an antecedent that is
assumed to be a categorical variable with a finite set of possible val-
ues. For example, the feature network protocol has a finite set of
values: tcp, udp and other protocols. As the number of antecedents
in a rule may vary, the variable also has an UNK token for rules
where the antecedent is not present. Each rule represents a partic-
ular attack / threat. When Ri is provided as a seed (initialization)
rule to the model, it is represented as Oi .
Antecedent Type Value
protocol tcp
source IP $EXTERNAL_NET
source port any
target IP $HOME_NET
target port [139,445],
[135,139,445,593,1024:]
flow established,to_server
dce_iface 12345678-1234-abcd-ef00
-0123456789ab
metadata policy balanced-ips
drop, policy security-ips
drop,service netbios-ssn
dce_opnum 0, 1
byte_test 4,>,256,8,relative,dce,
4,>,512,8,relative,dce
Table 2: A sample set of antecedents that are extracted from
two rules. The rules have all same antecedents except the target
port number where one rule checks more ports, byte_test and
dce_opnum.
To explain the objectives and system architecture, let us consider
an example rules set consisting of two rules. Consider the first rule
R1 has a SID: 13162 (from table 3). Table 2 has the complete set of an-
tecedents identified from the two rules. Thus, the two rules differ in
only the target port numbers, byte_test and dce_opnum. Given
all the antecedents and their possible values, the total number of
rules possible are 8 (for each combination target port, byte_test
and dce_opnum). Let R1 contain the combination target port =
[139,445], byte_test = 4,>,256,8,relative,dce,dce_opnum =
0 while R2 has target port = [135,139,445,593,1024:], and
byte_test = 4,>,512,8,relative,dce as well as dce_opnum = 1.
Let R1 be the seed rule (represented as O1).
3.2 Definition
In this section, we provide the exact definition of abductive rea-
soning. Generating a hypothesis rule can be categorized into the
following tasks:
Abducing Antecedents. In this task, each hypothesis is con-
sidered to be an existing rule with a single antecedent Ap being
different. Thus,Ap < {Aij | Aij ∈ Oi } for given observationOi (seed
rule).
In case of the example described above, we compute the probabil-
ity of the hypothesis rule having the target port = [135,139,445
,593,1024:] given R1 with byte_test = 4,>,256,8,relative,
dce (the combination does not exist in the rules set).
Once the probabilities of all the antecedent values that are not
part of the seed rule, are computed, the next step is to select an
antecedent as a replacement for its corresponding value in the seed.
There are three strategies that can be applied, i.e., choosing the
antecedent Ap that has maximum-likelihood, selecting the top k
most likely antecedents, or defining a threshold likelihood t , above
which all antecedents are selected.
Abducing Rules. In this task, each hypothesis is a rule that can
have multiple antecedents from the seed rule replaced or inserted.
Generating hypotheses where likely antecedents are inserted into
the seed rule, has a high computational cost. This is because the
possible combinations are exponential. Hence rule abduction is
constrained to replacing a set of antecedents in the seed rules only.
For the previous example, this will lead to a hypothesis rule hav-
ing target port = [135,139,445,593,1024:] and dce_opnum
= 1 if both antecedents are selected.
3.3 System Architecture
In this section, each component of the pipeline is described. Figure
1 shows the overall system architecture and how a snort rule is
processed. We use Scikit-learn [26] for data preprocessing and
constructing the Bayesian network.
Rule Preprocessing. In this step, the snort rules are parsed and
converted to a categorical variable. Snort consists of a fixed set of po-
sition attributes, namely, alert, source IP, source port number,
destination IP and destination port number. The remaining
antecedents / attributes are in the form of key-value pairs. We use
the keys as nodes in a graphical model and the values represent
the set of possible states the variable can take. Thus, a vocabulary
of possible values is built for each attribute including attributes
such as content and pcre. We note that, although, content and
pcre are strings that can potentially have infinite permutations,
in this paper they are considered to have a finite set of possible
values bounded by the rules set R. Thus each attribute is treated as
a categorical variable. Since we construct a multivariate Bayesian
model, the attribute values are then converted to one-hot encoded
/ binary features. In figure 1, A represents the snort rule (from the
rules set R), B is the snort rule that is generated and X represents
the missing / likely antecedents when a seed rule is provided.
Not all attributes in a snort rule are useful though. A list of
excluded attributes is created that contains attributes like sid, rev
and reference. The sid is the signature ID of the rule and rev is
the revision number for the snort rule. Reference contains external
links to information about the attack the snort rule is capturing.
Information contained in the reference attribute can be a URL to
CVE description, microsoft security bulletin or another external
source. The snort rule for alert A in figure 1 shows the sample
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Snort Rule SIG-ID
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET [139,445] (msg:"NETBIOS DCERPC NCACN-IP-TCP spoolss
EnumPrinters overflow attempt"; flow:established,to_server;
dce_iface:12345678-1234-abcd-ef00-0123456789ab; dce_opnum:0; dce_stub_data; byte_test:4,>,256,8,dce
relative; metadata:policy balanced-ips drop, policy security-ips drop,service netbios-ssn;
reference:bugtraq,21220; reference:cve,2006-5854; reference:cve,2006-6114; reference:cve,2008-0639;
classtype: attempted-admin; sid:13162; rev:9;)
13162
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET [135,139,445,593,1024:] (msg: "NETBIOS Generated rule alert
from ID-250001"; metadata:policy balanced-ips drop, policy security-ips drop, service
netbios-ssn; dce_opnum:0;flow:established,to_server;
dce_iface:12345678-1234-abcd-ef00-0123456789ab;byte_test:4,>,256,8,relative,dce; sid:250001;rev:1)
250001
Table 3: The table shows a seed rule SID: 13162 and a new generated rule with SID: 250001. The generated rule has all properties of the
seed, with one difference: the destination port attribute has been modified from [139,445] to [135,139,445,593,1024:], thus expanding the rules
application to additional ports where an attacker might target the system in the future.
reference. Additionally, attributes that have a constant value like
snort rule: alert are discarded.
Building a Bayesian Model. Once the snort rules are prepro-
cessed, the one-hot encoded attributes are concatenated to form a
feature vector to train the Bayesian network. To train the model
and infer efficiently, we assume the attributes to be conditionally
independent.
P(aj | ai ..an ) = argmax
aj ∈Aj
n∏
i=1
P(aj | ai ) (3)
where, aj is the specific antecedent value (Aj is the categorical
variable) to be predicted given the other observed antecedents.
While inferring, individual antecedents are not observable. The
antecedent is known to be true only when a snort rule generates an
alert. Thus, while inferring the values of antecedents, attributes that
are not a part of the snort rule are assumed to be UNK. To generalize
the model better for UNK (unknown) tokens a Laplace smoothing is
applied,
P(aj | ai ) =
F (aj , ai ) + α
F (ai ) + α |T | (4)
where, |T | represents all the samples in the training set.
Generating Snort Rules. After building the Bayesian network,
the model is able to predict the maximum likely antecedent values
or the missing attributes when provided with a seed rule Oi . As
discussed before, we can choose the antecedent either using MLE
or the most likely topk values or based on a threshold set manually.
Selections based on the MLE can be highly restrictive. Instead, we
select all antecedent predictions that are above a threshold t . They
are combined with the original antecedents of the seed rule in an
unordered list. They then form a graph (represented as adjacency
matrix) where each value for an antecedent is linked to a value of
the next antecedent in the list. We use a depth-first search (DFS)
method to generate each possible combinations from the predicted
values and eliminate the rules that are copies of the seed. The
threshold t has a direct impact on how many rules are generated
as it controls values that are predicted.
In the example, let us assume the target port value [135,139,
445,593,1024:] and dce_opnum value 1 have likelihoods greater
than the threshold t . The additional antecedents are added to the
adjacency matrix formed from the attributes in rule R1. We generate
all combinations of rules from this graph and eliminate copies of R1.
The final rule generated is shown in table 3 (rule SIG-ID: 250001).
3.4 Expanding Features Using Clustering
Although attributes like content and pcre are assumed to be cat-
egorical for the purpose of training the model, they can provide
insight into rules that are similar based how close the content
/ pcre string is to another rule. Thus, clustering can be used to
identify similar rules. One of the ways to cluster snort rules is by
using hierarchical agglomerative clustering [30] with a customized
Levenshtein distance measure [25] computed in the following man-
ner:
D(ri , r j ) = w1 • KDi, j + w2 •
∑
c ∈ki & c ∈kj
levc (rci , rcj ) (5)
As seen in equation 5, the metric is a weighted distance where, ri
and r j represent the snort rules, KDi, j , the key distance, is the sym-
metric difference between the attributes set in ri and r j , levc (rci , rcj )
is the Levenhstein distance between the value of rci and r
c
j (c is
a common attribute between ri and r j ). Weights w1 and w2 are
hyperparameters.
4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS & ANALYSIS
4.1 Dataset
We use two datasets in our experiments. The first is the commu-
nity edition of snort rules from 2012. The rules are tested on snort
version 2.9.21 that was released in 2012. The dataset contains 43792
rules. A wide variety of rules are available. From these, five cate-
gories are selected, namely, special-attacks, web-misc, web-cgi,
web-php and netbios (selected categories have the large number
of rules). Table 4 shows the different types of rules and the number
of rules available for each type. As the abduced antecedents or
rules generated are specific to each rule set type, the models and
experiments are performed independently. The second dataset is
the MACCDC 2012 dataset [6]. This dataset consists of series of
raw pcap files collected from various attack simulations.
4.2 Abducing Antecedents
As described in task 1 (sub-section 3.2), we test whether the model is
able to abduce a single missing antecedent. The experiment gives us
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Rule Type Number of Rules
Special Attacks 902
Web-Misc 643
Web-CGI 379
Web-PHP 201
Netbios 540
Table 4: The number of rules for each rule-type in snort that is used
in the experiments.
an idea about the correlations between different attributes that form
the rules. The test is conducted in the form of a leave one column
out (LOCO) experiment where the column left out is considered
missing. Each rule set in table 4 is randomly split into a training
and test set with 90% of data used for training. We perform 10-
fold cross-validation to test. Also, the rules are clustered with the
customized Levenhstein distance (refer to subsection 3.4). After
agglomerative clustering is executed, a clusterID is assigned to rules
that are similar. The clusterID is used as a feature while training the
network. The Bayesian model (with and without cluster features)
are in green and blue respectively.
The performance of the two networks is compared against a
random baseline (red) and max frequency classifier (purple) (i.e. a
classifier that predicts the same label with the maximum frequency
in the training dataset). Figure 2-6 shows the performance of the
different classifiers.
4.3 Analysis & Discussion
As seen in Figures 2-6, the performance of the Bayesian network
with and without clusterID feature is better than the max frequency
classifier for most attributes. They perform better than the ran-
dom baseline for all attributes. For attributes such as distance and
depth in figure 2, detection_filter and dsize in figure 3, depth
in figure 4, the performance of the max frequency classifier is equal
or better than Bayesian models. This is because the classifier per-
forms well when the attribute has a skewed set of values. Consider
figure 3 that shows the classification performance for Netbios. The
Bayesian classifiers have equal accuracy with the maximum fre-
quency classifier for attributes dsize and detection_filter. The
following table shows the frequency of individual labels for each
of these attributes. As seen in the tables 5 and 6, the majority of
Antecedent Frequency
UNK 538
track by_dst,count 10,seconds 60 2
Table 5: Frequency of unique detection_filter attribute values in
the dataset of size 540.
the values in detection_filter are UNK tokens (as they are rarely
present in snort rules) leading the Bayesian models to perform
poorly with respect to other labels. In comparison, the model has
a better performance for an attribute like flow (table 7) that has a
distribution of unique labels that is less skewed.
Antecedent Frequency
UNK 538
<56 1
>100 1
Table 6: Frequency of unique dsize attribute values in the dataset
of size 540. The high frequency of UNK labels leads a higher perfor-
mance by the maximum frequency classifier.
Antecedent Frequency
established,to_server 271
UNK 119
to_server, established 80
established,to_client 26
stateless 24
to_client,established 11
established, to_server 4
to_server 4
established,to_server,no_stream 1
Table 7: Frequency of unique flow attribute values. The unique val-
ues have a distribution where the skew is limited. This leads to of a
maximum frequency classifier that performs poorly in comparison.
4.4 Qualitative Analysis of New Rules
To test the quality of the new rules generated (task 2 in sub-section
3.2), we compare the alerts observed using the seed rule and those
generated when the new rules are added to the snort configuration.
When snort configuration is updated with them, the seed rule is
deactivated. This measures their impact independent of the seed.
To generate the rules a single seed rule is provided to the model.
To generate the rules a threshold posterior probability is defined
for each attribute and used to retrieve the top k values for each
antecedent. We perform our tests with a threshold of 0.01.
To compare the alerts generated by both configurations, the pcap
file from the MACCDC 2012 dataset is replayed on snort with each
individual setting. We analyze if any of the alerts generated while
using the new rules are false alarms by associating the timestamps
of these alerts for both configurations. Table 8 shows the timestamps
when alerts for seed and new rules are generated. Then, we calculate
the number of alerts generated.
Since the original rule is a Netbios rule (SID: 13162), we look
at the alerts generated for Netbios only. With the original rules,
330 alerts are generated while with the new rules, 421 alerts are
generated.
4.5 Impact Of Threshold
To test how the threshold affects the rules generated, consider the
same seed rule (SID: 13162) as before. We check the rules gener-
ated from the seed for varying threshold conditions. The threshold
parameter controls the size of the top k predicted values for each
attribute and thus the types of rules that are generated. A low
threshold increases the size of the top k list and generates more
combinations of rules. On the other hand, with a high threshold,
the system may be unable to generate rules at all. To understand
the impact of this parameter, we checked the number of rules that
6
Figure 2: Classification accuracy for each attribute on theWeb-Misc ruleset.
Figure 3: Classification accuracy for each attribute on the Netbios ruleset.
are generated for a range of threshold values (as shown in Figure
7).
5 CONCLUSION & FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we show that a Bayesian model trained on snort rules
can be utilized to abduce antecedents and to generate a set of new
7
Figure 4: Classification accuracy for each attribute on the Special Attacks ruleset.
Figure 5: Classification accuracy for each attribute on theWeb-CGI ruleset.
snort rules that are modifications of an existing rule. By treating the
missing antecedents either as incomplete or modified conditions,
the model provides snort the ability to predict missing antecedents
and generate alerts for rules that are likely to be triggered but
whose conditions have not beenmet yet because a potential attacker
has modified the threat vector. Also, we show that snort rules
are inherently incomplete and designed for specific attacks whose
pattern is well established. Abducing new snort rules expands the
rules set, prepare the system better for attacks in the future and
also provides a measure of the incompleteness of the rule set.
8
Figure 6: Classification accuracy for each attribute on theWeb-PHP ruleset.
Time Snort Alert
3/16-08:48:55.570000 [1:2349:10] NETBIOS DCERPC NCACN-IP-TCP spoolss EnumPrinters attempt [Classification
:Generic Protocol Command Decode] [Priority: 3]
{TCP} 192.168.202.94:52307 -> 192.168.23.100:445
03/16-08:48:55.570000 [**] [1:250016:1] NETBIOS Generated rule alert from ID-250016 [**] [Priority: 0]
{TCP} 192.168.202.94:52307 -> 192.168.23.100:445
Table 8: The first alert is generated from an existing snort rule (SID:2349) while the second alert is from a snort rule (SID: 2500016) derived
using the Bayesian model.
Figure 7: The number of rules generated for different threshold pa-
rameters.
In the future, we will experiment with different graphical and
neural network models such as Markov Logic Networks (MLN)
[17] and Logic Tensor Networks (LTN) [31] as a substitute for our
Bayesian approach. Today, LTNs are trained for deductive reason-
ing but they can be extended to perform abductive reasoning. We
can expand the current reasoning approach to abduce rules that
have antecedents more than the seed rule and experiment against
multiple missing values in the observation as compared to a single
missing attribute in this paper.
Apart from enhancing the current generation of signature-based
systems with additional reasoning, the bayesian model provides
us with a template for more abstract reasoning. More et. al [21]
demonstrate a system that can detect potential attacks by com-
bining information from various “sensors" on the network i.e. IDS,
network traffic analyzers, system logs and so on taking a more holis-
tic view to detect a potential attack. The system can be extended
when the ontology is grounded with knowledge about prior attacks.
The Unified Cybersecurity Ontology (UCO) does so by combining
cybersecurity concepts from multiple known security ontologies
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like CVE [7] and STIX [2]. In our view, the bayesian model can
be extended to reason with a set of rules designed to operate on
such ontologies. Cognitive Cybersecurity System (CCS) [24] is an
example of such a system.
The experiments in this paper make an implicit assumption that
given the increase in the number of alerts and the timestamp of
when the alerts were generated, the rules are detecting potentially
new attacks. Our future experiments will analyze the false alarm
rates (FAR) for abduced rules.
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